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Abstract
This study has been carried out aiming at mea-
suring the organizational intelligence of the experts 
and managers of the cement factory in Sistan. The 
research is practical-descriptive and the statistical 
population includes all 50 experts and managers of the 
cement factory in Sistan. Sampling method was con-
sensus. Therefore, all the population was considered, 
yet 42 questionnaires were returned for analysis. The 
instrumentation included the 49-question Albrecht’s 
organizational intelligence questionnaire. The con-
tent validity and its reliability (using Cronbach index = 
0.81) were calculated. The results show that the orga-
nizational intelligence of the experts and managers of 
the Sistan cement factory is unacceptably below aver-
age. The findings also revealed that the parameters of 
strategic vision, shared fate, appetite for change, and 
alignment and congruence were below average and 
the ones of heart, knowledge deployment, and perfor-
mance pressure were above average.
Keywords: Intelligence, Organizational Intelli-
gence, Sistan Cement Factory
Introduction
With the increasing changes and revolutions in the 
world of today which is the era of information and com-
munication and due to instability and changeability 
and also unpredictability of these changes, what aides 
countries especially the developing ones to increase 
their productivity, progress and advancement is utiliz-
ing the opportunities in competitions with other. This 
in turn will not be achieved except with managers’ intel-
ligence and also their influence in making the experts 
innovative. These two cooperatively pave the way for 
the growth of the organization and the society at large 
as well (Hemmati, 2009). One of the indicators of in-
novation is high intelligence. In other words, it is the 
track and footprint of appearance of innovation. The 
logical relation between the two is not mutually exclu-
sive though. Sometimes the intelligence is high yet in-
novation does not occur and sometimes based on the 
appearance of innovation, high intelligence is assumed 
(Ramazani,  2009). Intelligent individuals have features 
such as ability to comprehend complicated information 
from the outside world and execute correct reaction to 
this information and also learn fast. Similarly, organi-
zations have levels of intelligence. Some organizations 
have low intelligence; they cannot make most obvious 
changes in their surroundings or react to them, they no-
tice the issued wit delay and repeat their mistakes again. 
Some other organizations have characteristics of intelli-
gent people. These organizations are interested in novel 
subjects and accept new topics curiously. They are con-
gruent and flexible in reactions and they are able to learn 
fast. In general, intelligent organizations are the ones 
having high speed of learning, sharing information and 
reacting to managerial revolutions ( Atashpour,  2008).
Gardner posed a question as to which of these 
people are more significant and more intelligent: Al-
bert Einstein (physician), Virginia Woolf (Novelist), 
Igor Stravinsky (Musician and composer), Pablo Pi-
casso (painter), Martha Graham (Choreographist and 
dancer), Mahatma Gandhi (politician and social paci-
fist), and Sigmund Freud (psychologist). Many other 
names can be added to the list including Beethoven, 
Shakespeare, Da Vinci, Michelangelo, and Bach and 
many others from the east, like Hafiz, Rumi, Khwariz-
mi, Aboureyhan, and Avicenna. The common feature 
in all these people is to play a great role in the revo-
lution and advancement of the human civilization. In 
Gardner’s belief, you cannot compare these people 
Social science section
960 Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com 
with one another. This is because comparison calls 
for a specific single definition of intelligence which is 
not reasonable. Changing this definition will naturally 
change the option (Gardner, H. 1999).
According to Binet and Simon, intelligence is 
the ability to judge, understand and reason. It is also 
defined as feeling good, ability to adapt, and be-
ing innovative and creative (Ramazani,  2009). In 
general, intelligence is the ability to learn and apply 
what has been learned in adapting with a new situa-
tion and solving new problems (Mann,  2009).
Organizational Intelligence
According to Albrecht, for a basketball team, a 
music band, a military unit, a small or big business 
or any organization to succeed, they need to trans-
late individual intelligence into a common collec-
tive intelligence (Albrecht, K. 2003). The concen-
tration of this concept is on the unity of the human 
technical abilities to solve problems and to be more 
specific, organizational intelligence includes the to-
tality and universality of organization information, 
experience, knowledge, and understanding.
Experts have provided different definitions of 
organizational intelligence:
1. Glynn argues that organizational intelligence is 
the result of addition and interaction of the intelligenc-
es of the individuals in an organization. Organizational 
intelligence is a social process whose theory is designed 
based on human intelligence theories (Glynn, 1996).
2. McMaster (1996) defined organizational in-
telligence as the capacity of a system to accumulate 
information, innovation, production of knowledge 
and deploying that knowledge in the organization ( 
McMaster , M. 1996).
3. According to Liebowitz, organizational intel-
ligence can be defined as a horde of all intelligences 
which are employed in order to create a common 
outlook, to conduct revision process and to direct 
the whole system ( Liebowitz, 1999).
4. In Simic’s opinion, organizational intel-
ligence is intellectual ability of an organization to 
solve organizational problems and its emphasis is on 
the concentration of human and technical abilities 
in problem-solving (Simic,  2005).
5. Matsuda contends that organizational intel-
ligence is a complex, interactive, accumulated, co-
ordinating set of the organization’s human and ma-
chine intelligences as a whole (Matsuda, 1988).
6. Karl Albrecht defines organizational intel-
ligence as the ability that provokes intellectual ca-
pacities of an organization and concentrates them 
to reach the missions (Albrecht, 2003).
7. In Halal’s idea, organizational intelligence is 
creating and deploying the proper knowledge in ad-
aptation to the environment (Halal, 2000).
8. Schwaninger considers organizational intel-
ligence the ability of an organization in compre-
hending and responding to the environment in or-
der to achieve its goals and satisfies its stakeholders ( 
Schwaninger, M., 2006).
9. Leon and Gabriela maintain that organiza-
tional intelligence is the ability of an organization in 
creating knowledge and deploying it strategically so 
as to adapt to its environment (Leon, Florin, Gabri-
ela, Atanasiu. 2009).
Components of Organizational Intelligence
Karl Albrecht asserts that organizational intel-
ligence is comprised of 7 parameters:
Strategic Vision: Every organization in a sense 
needs an organized principle and a definition of the 
destination it is attempting to reach. The leaders of 
organizations have to have answers to these ques-
tions: Who are we? What do we exist for? What is the 
philosophy of our existence? Why should our fellow 
countrymen and even the people of the world accept 
us, appreciate us and pay us for what we do? Notice 
that strategic vision refers to organizational ability in 
creating, nourishing, and expressing the aims of the 
organization. The assumption of the strategic vision 
is that the leaders are able to express the concept of 
success and when needed they are able to recreate 
this concept (Albrecht,  2003).
Shared Fate: This means that the staffs are able 
to cooperatively step towards their visions and reach 
a feeling of “being on the same boat.” This gives 
them a sense of unity and oneness. Alternatively, 
when members and employees lack a common out-
look and concept of success, there is no hope for 
that boat to reach its destination (Albrecht,  2003).
Appetite for Change: In some organizational cul-
tures, the way of functioning, thinking, and reacting 
to the surrounding environment is stabilized to the 
extent that any change is a considered an illness or 
a riot. On the other hand, in some others, the word 
“change” refers to gaining new experiences and it is 
an exciting term, and in other words it is “a chance 
to start a new activity.” People in this second kind 
need the recreation of models of business as an ex-
citing challenge and see the change as an opportuni-
ty to learn new methods. This parameter is the driv-
ing force for the strategic vision (Albrecht, 2003).
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Heart: This dimension is the willingness to cooper-
ate over the standard. Each and every member of the 
staff has to be responsible to cooperate in the affairs of 
the organization. The amount of energy over your regu-
lar responsibility is call optional attempt by social psy-
chologists. In organizations with little or no emotional 
bonds, staffs only do what they have to. In organizations 
with high rate of love of work, members will cooperate 
more than what they are expected to (Albrecht, 2003).
 Alignment and Congruence: Any group of over 
12 people will clash without a determined system of 
rules. They have to organize, divide responsibilities, 
and set rules for interaction and response to environ-
ment. In short, in intelligent organizations, organiza-
tional system and structure and rules and regulations 
are in the direction of group learning and coopera-
tion of the employees and eventually, creation of val-
ues and getting the mission done (Albrecht,  2003).
Knowledge Deployment: Today, more than ever, suc-
cess and failure of organizations are based on their ef-
fective use of data, information and knowledge. Capac-
ity of creation, transference, organization, sharing and 
deploying knowledge is a vital and significant aspect of 
competition in complicated environments. The factor 
“knowledge deployment” shows the capacity that the 
culture and atmosphere creates to use valuable mental 
and information resources (Albrecht, 2003).
In this regard, knowledge deployment is better to 
be considered a humanistic factor than a structural 
or technological one. Organizational intelligence in-
cludes free flow of knowledge all over the organization 
and making a balance between maintaining invaluable 
information and access of key people to it when it is 
due. Encouraging and protecting new ideas and ques-
tioning the current conditions are other features of this 
facet of organizational intelligence (Albrecht,  2003).
Performance Pressure: This is not correct that 
only managers get involved with the performance 
and in other words, reaching the strategic goals and 
results.In an intelligent organization, each person 
is responsible about their own performance. When 
each person is asked questions about their share of 
responsibility the culture of performance pressure is 
shaped and any new member can feel this common 
sense (Albrecht,  2003).
Having said all this, one can conclude that orga-
nizational intelligence of the experts is very crucial 
for any organization. This article studies the orga-
nizational intelligence of the experts and managers 
of Sistan cement factory. The results can help senior 
managers be able to direct staff inside the organiza-
tion and satisfy customers outside.
Previous studies 
Mary Ann Glynn (1996) examined the relationship 
between organizational innovation and organizational 
intelligence. In this study, she pointed to the similarities 
between human intelligence and organizational intel-
ligence. Organizational intelligence is the social result 
of individual intelligence and is related to it. As inno-
vation means a novel idea, it requires intelligence and 
lack of individual and organizational intelligence can 
cause bafflement and inability in solving the problems. 
Organizational intelligence can help the organization 
through with the confusing and mysterious environ-
ment of today (Glynn, 1996). The purpose of the study 
entitled “The Dimension of Organizational Intelligence 
in Romanian Companies—A Human Capital Perspec-
tive” is to provide a general outlook of the status of the 
experts in Romanian companies considering the seven 
aspects of Albrecht’s organizational intelligence. Also, 
big companies with over 150 staff members, in this 
study, are compared to smaller ones, with this presump-
tion that human resources and cultural differences of 
organizations and their leadership can make a differ-
ence in understanding the concept of organizational 
intelligence and its function. The result was that only 
13% of the big companies’ experts were familiar with the 
concept of organizational intelligence and small com-
panies’ experts were not familiar at all. However, data 
analysis showed average or higher organizational intel-
ligence (Lefter,  Prejmerean, & Vasilache,  2008).
Another study entitled “Is It Possible to Increase 
Organizational Intelligence through In-Service Train-
ing?” was carried out in Turkey with the aim of deter-
mination of the effect of strategic analysis (SWOT) on 
organizational intelligence. The method was experi-
ential with pre-test and post-test and population of an 
elementary school with a sample of 40 teachers and two 
managers. In order to measure organizational intelli-
gence a multi-faceted intelligence scale was applied with 
facets including agility in action and reaction, compat-
ibility with diverse surroundings, remaining calm, flex-
ibility in function, using imagination, prediction and 
anticipation, making an effective communication with 
colleagues, and finding solutions for the rising odds. 
To measure all this, a 58-question questionnaire with 
5 scales was designed. The result shows vast difference 
before and after the workshop, with the exception of the 
effective communication with colleagues which showed 
no significant difference (Atashpour, 2008).
A study on organizational intelligence among Aus-
tralian managers was done by Albrecht (September 
2003) in which from among 200 managers and VPs of 
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100 companies in a seminar, 128 questionnaires were 
completed and showed acceptable results: Albrecht first 
explained the 7 parameter of organizational intelligence 
and then asked the managers to determine their organi-
zation’s intelligence. In this study, the highest rate was 
for revision of annual strategies from the third question 
“strategic vision” and also “heart” (question 25) with  a 
rate of 3.41 from parameter 5 and the lowest were prob-
lem-solving from parameter “performance pressure” 
(question 45) with a rate of 2.38. This was while the ma-
jority of the managers there thought their organization 
would have a high organizational intelligence. 20-25 of 
them rated their organization as having 5 out of 5 with 
organizational intelligence. But the averages gained 
showed much incredibly lower results. In a replication 
of the same study, American managers determined their 
organizations’ organizational intelligence comparably 
lower than average (Albrecht, 2003).
Kimasi, Chisazan, and Fakher (2011), conducted 
a descriptive-practical study on the differences of or-
ganizational intelligence between public and private 
banks. The standard 49-item questionnaire with 7 pa-
rameteres was registered to 29 experts in 2 public and 2 
private banks. The results showed a significantly higher 
organizational intelligence among private banks ex-
perts (Kimasi,, Chitsazan, Hasty & Fakher, 2011).
Alvani, Beignia, and Hemmati Mohajer (2012) 
carried out a study entitled “correlation between 
organizational structure and organizational intelli-
gence” in state organizations in the province of Lo-
restan. The variables included: organizational struc-
ture (formality, complexity, and concentration) and 
organizational intelligence (strategic vision, shared 
fate, appetite for change, heart, alignment and con-
gruence, and knowledge deployment). The results 
showed that stable structured organizations enjoy 
less organizational intelligence and dynamic struc-
tured organizations enjoy more intelligence (Alvani, 
Beiginia, Abdorreza & Hemmatimohajer,  2011).
Tabarsa, Abdali, and Hatami (2012) did a research 
entitled “Increasing Organizational Knowledge-Cre-
ation: Explanation of the Role of Organizational Intel-
ligence and Organizational Learning” in Saipa Yadak 
Co. In this study the researchers examined the role 
of organizational intelligence on knowledge-creation 
via organizational learning. To test the third hypoth-
esis of the research 140 experts of the central office 
of the company were used. The results showed a high 
causation between organizational intelligence and 
organizational learning and between organizational 
intelligence and knowledge-creation. It also showed 
significant positive causation between organizational 
learning and knowledge-creation (Alvani, et al,  2011).
Research Hypotheses
Main hypothesis: the organizational intelli-
gence of the managers and experts of Sistan cement 
factory is favorable.
Secondary hypotheses:
1. The level of strategic vision parameter of the man-
agers and experts of Sistan cement factory is favorable.
2. The level of shared fate parameter of the manag-
ers and experts of Sistan cement factory is favorable. 
3. The level of appetite for change parameter of 
the managers and experts of Sistan cement factory 
is favorable. 
4. The level of heart parameter of the managers 
and experts of Sistan cement factory is favorable. 
5. The level of alignment and congruence pa-
rameter of the managers and experts of Sistan ce-
ment factory is favorable. 
6. The level of knowledge deployment param-
eter of the managers and experts of Sistan cement 
factory is favorable. 
7. The level of performance pressure parameter 
of the managers and experts of Sistan cement fac-
tory is favorable.
Methodology
This study is a practical one in terms of its purpose 
and descriptive in terms of method. The data gather-
ing approach is field study and the instrument is ques-
tionnaire (Albrecht 2003).Content validity was run. 
Modifications based on the views of the supervisor and 
advisor was made and then the instrument was applied. 
The reliability of the questionnaire in Cronbach Alpha 
was 0.81. The population was all the experts and man-
agers of the Sistan cement factory. As the population 
was limited all were sample in a consensus and given 
a questionnaire each. The variables experience, edu-
cational background and organizational position were 
considered and 50 questionnaires were administered 
and 45 returned filled out. As 3 of them were partially 
filled in, the remaining 42 were statistically analyzed.
Results
Main Hypothesis: the organizational intelli-
gence of the managers and experts of Sistan cement 
factory is favorable.
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The results of figure 1 show that the mean and 
standard deviation of the organizational intelligence 
of the managers and experts in Sistan Factory are 
142.00 and 26.08 which is less than the mean of the 
test (147) and considering the amount of Sig, one 
can conclude that with the certainty level of 99%, 
One-Sample Statistics
42 142.2143 26.08199 4.02454OI
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
-1.189 41 .241 -4.78571 -12.9134 3.3420OI
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 147
Figure 1. One-sample t-test results for the Main hypothesis
the level of organizational intelligence of the experts 
and managers of this factory is below the average 
and not favorable.
Secondary Hypothesis 1: The level of strategic 
vision parameter of the managers and experts of Sis-
tan cement factory is appropriate .
One-Sample Statistics
42 19.1905 6.09373 .94028strategicvision
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
-1.924 41 .061 -1.80952 -3.7085 .0894strategicvision
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 21
 Figure 2.  One-sample t-test results for the secondary hypothesis 1
The results of figure 2 show that the mean and 
standard deviation of strategic vision parameter of 
the managers and experts of Sistan cement factory 
are 19.1905 and 6.09 which is less than the mean 
of the test (21) and considering the amount of Sig, 
one can conclude that with the certainty level of 
99%, the level of strategic vision parameter of the 
experts and managers of this factory is below the 
average.
Secondary Hypothesis 2:The level of shared fate 
parameter of the managers and experts of Sistan ce-
ment factory is favorable.
One-Sample Statistics
42 18.2381 6.56602 1.01316Sharedfate
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
-2.726 41 .009 -2.76190 -4.8080 -.7158Sharedfate
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 21
Figure 3. One-sample t-test results for the secondary hypothesis 2 
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The results of figure 3 show that the mean and stan-
dard deviation of shared fate parameter of the managers 
and experts in Sistan Factory are 18.238 and 6.56 which 
is less than the mean of the test (21) and considering the 
amount of Sig, one can conclude that with the certainty 
level of 99%, the level of shared fate parameter of the ex-
perts and managers of this factory is below the average.
Secondary Hypothesis 3: The level of appetite 
for change parameter of the managers and experts 
of Sistan cement factory is favorable.
One-Sample Statistics
42 20.8810 4.26673 .65837Appetiteforchange
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
-.181 41 .857 -.11905 -1.4487 1.2106Appetiteforchange
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 21
Figure 4.  One-sample t-test results for the secondary hypothesis 3
The results of figure 4 show that the mean and 
standard deviation of appetite for change param-
eterof the managers and experts in Sistan Factory 
are 20.881 and 4.26 which is less than the mean of 
the test (21) and considering the amount of Sig, 
one can conclude that with the certainty level of 
99%, the level of appetite for change parameter of 
the experts and managers of this factory is below 
the average.
Secondary Hypothesis 4:The level of heart pa-
rameter of the managers and experts of Sistan ce-
ment factory is favorable.
The results of figure 5 show that the mean and 
standard deviation of heart parameter of the man-
agers and experts in Sistan Factory are 21.595 and 
4.788 which is bigger than the mean of the test (21) 
and considering the amount of Sig, one can con-
clude that with the certainty level of 99%, the level 
of heart parameter of the experts and managers of 
this factory is above the average.
Secondary Hypothesis 5:The level of alignment 
and congruence parameter of the managers and ex-
perts of Sistan cement factory is favorable. 
One-Sample Statistics
42 21.5952 4.78850 .73888Heart
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
.806 41 .425 .59524 -.8970 2.0874Heart
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 21
Figure 5.  One-sample t-test results for the secondary hypothesis 4
The results of figure 6 show that the mean and 
standard deviation of alignment and congruence pa-
rameter of the managers and experts in Sistan Factory 
are 19.624 and 8.08 which is less than the mean of the 
test (21) and considering the amount of Sig, one can 
conclude that with the certainty level of 99%, the level 
of alignment and congruence parameter of the experts 
and managers of this factory is below the average.
Secondary Hypothesis 6:The level of knowledge 
deployment parameter of the managers and experts 
of Sistan cement factory is favorable. 
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One-Sample Statistics
42 19.6429 8.08438 1.24745Alignment
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
-1.088 41 .283 -1.35714 -3.8764 1.1621Alignment
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 21
Figure 6.  One-sample t-test results for the secondary hypothesis 5
The results of figure 7 show that the mean and 
standard deviation of knowledge deployment pa-
rameter of the managers and experts in Sistan Fac-
tory are 21.404 and 4.958 which is bigger than the 
mean of the test (21) and considering the amount of 
Sig, one can conclude that with the certainty level of 
One-Sample Statistics
42 21.4048 4.95866 .76514Knowledge
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
.529 41 .600 .40476 -1.1405 1.9500Knowledge
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 21
Figure 7.  One-sample t-test results for the secondary hypothesis 5
99%, the level of knowledge deployment parameter 
of the experts and managers of this factory is above 
the average.
Secondary Hypothesis 7:The level of perfor-
mance pressure parameter of the managers and ex-
perts of Sistan cement factory is favorable.
One-Sample Statistics
42 21.2619 4.56423 .70428Performance
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
One-Sample Test
.372 41 .712 .26190 -1.1604 1.6842Performance
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 21
Figure 8.  One-sample t-test results for the secondary hypothesis 6
The results of the figure 8 show that the mean 
and standard deviation of performance pressure pa-
rameter of the managers and experts in Sistan Fac-
tory are 21.261 and 4.564 which is bigger than the 
mean of the test (21) and considering the amount of 
Sig, one can conclude that with the certainty level 
of 99%, the level of performance pressure parameter 
of the experts and managers of this factory is above 
the average.
Conclusion
Considering the results of the main hypothesis 
of the study it is concluded that the level of the orga-
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nizational intelligence of the Sistan cement factory 
is below the average and not favorable.
The results of the secondary hypotheses showed 
that the parameters of strategic vision, shared fate, 
appetite for change, and alignment and congruence 
are below the average while the parameters of heart, 
knowledge deployment, performance pressure are 
above the average.
Among the parameters of organizational intel-
ligence the parameter of heart had the highest average 
(21.69) and the one of shared fate had the lowest (18.23) 
which needs more attention on the part of the managers.
Suggestions
In order to boost the level of the factory’s orga-
nizational intelligence, the suggestions below can be 
considered:
1. Reinforcing the strategic vision
- The most important issue in the view of strate-
gic vision is the provision of mission manifest of the 
organization. Therefore the management has to form 
a team for this matter .Therefore, they can take appro-
priate measures after examining the organizational en-
vironment to recognize the opportunities and threats.
- Every year the senior managers study and re-
vise the organizational strategies.
- In order for the experts and managers to get 
familiar with the idea of strategic vision, in-service 
educational courses can be held.
- Having a principled plan, the organization can 
identify, grow and elevate the strategist in the orga-
nization.
2. Intensifying the sense of shared fate
- Managers have to give credit and brief the 
experts in crucial matters and issues, because this 
boosts these individuals’ endeavor to reach the goals.
- Managers have to create a sense of trust, sympa-
thy, and friendship and also esteem, merit and perti-
nence among the staff. This will make the colleagues 
friendly and proud of their work and workplace.
3. Elevating the managers’ appetite for change
- With studying the environment of the organi-
zation, the activities have to be constantly growing 
and synchronizing with the changes of the organi-
zational environment.
- There has to be an encouragement system for 
the ones giving creative suggestions or better solu-
tions in organizational procedures.
- There has to be the required system as to pro-
tect innovation such as suggestions system, teams of 
product development, etc.
4. Reinforcement of alignment and congruence
- Senior managers have to pay heed to creating 
teams and approaches to boost rapport and friendly 
relations in the factory.
- Entrusting authority to the inferior will in-
crease a sense of alignment and congruence among 
managers and experts.
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